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Dworkin=s Perfectionism
James E. Fleming & Linda C. McClain1

I.

Ronald Dworkin: A Eulogy
Ronald Dworkin is widely and rightly viewed as the most important legal philosopher

and constitutional theorist of our time and as one of the leading figures in moral and political
philosophy. In the words of Marshall Cohen, Dworkin=s jurisprudential writings Aconstitute the
finest contribution yet made by an American writer to the philosophy of law.@2 And Cohen wrote
those words when Dworkin published his first book, Taking Rights Seriously, in 1977! His many
outstanding subsequent books and articles made good on that early, prescient assessment.
Dworkin is unmatched and unrivaled in legal philosophy and constitutional theory.
In the words of T.M. Scanlon, Dworkin is Aour leading public philosopher.@3 He regularly
published essays on legal and political subjects in the New York Review of Books from 1968
through 2013. Like many readers, we eagerly opened each issue hoping to find a new piece by
Dworkin. We shall miss that. Dworkin had the rare gift of being able to write abstractly in legal
philosophy and constitutional theory yet also to write accessibly for the general educated citizen.
He brought out the issues of moral and political principle at the heart of the major political and
constitutional issues of the day. His writing not only bristles with brilliant insights but also
exhorts and uplifts. Moreover, in courageous and spirited exchanges with leading conservatives,
like Richard Posner, Robert Bork, and Antonin Scalia, he gave as good as he got and then some!4
Over the years, one of us (Fleming) has organized a number of conferences in
constitutional theory and Dworkin was often the most appropriate keynote speaker. In
conferences at Fordham University School of Law on AFidelity in Constitutional Interpretation@
and ARawls and the Law@ and at Boston University School of Law on his book, Justice for
Hedgehogs, Dworkin delivered powerful and eloquent keynote lectures.5 The readers of this
book are likely familiar with the countless accounts of Dworkin=s brilliance as a lecturer: of how
he spoke without notes and with great flair, making it all seem so graceful and effortless. Even
more impressive, in our experience, was how seriously he took his lectures and how
energetically he responded to his interlocutors. In the conference at Boston University on Justice
for Hedgehogs, held when Dworkin was 78 years old, he demonstrated his characteristic energy
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by responding extemporaneously to all 31 commentators, one panel at a time, and elaborating
those initial thoughts in a published response.6 One of us had the privilege of writing the
biographical entry on Dworkin in the Yale Biographical Dictionary of American Law, and closed
that entry by stating: AHis work abounds with indefatigable energy, giving the impression that he
will not stop making arguments until he has put the clamps of reason upon every rational
being.@7
Dworkin=s famous Colloquium in Legal, Political, and Social Philosophy at New York
University (with Tom Nagel and sometimes Jeremy Waldron) set the standard for rigorous,
vigorous, and constructive dialogue concerning important scholarship in those fields. Many other
colloquia have been modeled upon it, but none has equaled it. Dworkin, Nagel, and Waldron
gave incisive summaries of the works being presented, asked apt questions, and pressed probing
and constructive criticisms. The command and vigor with which they did so was an inspiration to
all who presented work in the Colloquium and to all who participated. One of us (McClain)
benefitted both from the formative experience of being a student in the Colloquium and, years
later, from receiving the generous input of Dworkin and Nagel when presenting a paper in the
Colloquium.8
Dworkin=s work in legal philosophy and constitutional theory was so powerful and
fecund that it could inspire many careers wholly dedicated to building upon it and working out
its implications. Dworkin (along with John Rawls) has been a powerful inspiration for our own
work in constitutional theory. Fleming=s Securing Constitutional Democracy: The Case of
Autonomy puts forward a AConstitution-perfecting theory@ that aims, in the spirit of Dworkin, to
interpret the American Constitution so as to make it the best it can be.9 Sotirios Barbers=s and
Fleming=s book, Constitutional Interpretation: The Basic Questions, is a response to Dworkin=s
call, in Taking Rights Seriously, for a Afusion of constitutional law and moral theory.@10 Our
book, Ordered Liberty: Rights, Responsibilities, and Virtues, responds to charges that liberals
like Dworkin Atake rights [too] seriously,@ developing a civic liberalism that takes
responsibilities and civic virtues B as well as rights B seriously.11 And Fleming’s recent book,
Fidelity to Our Imperfect Constitution: For Moral Readings and Against Originalisms, joins
Dworkin in defending a moral reading or philosophic approach to constitutional interpretation
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over and against all forms of originalism.12 Finally, in evaluating new decisions by the United
States Supreme Court and addressing new challenges, McClain has found it fruitful to ask:
“What would Dworkin do?” or “What would Dworkin say?”13
Dworkin=s successor as Professor of Jurisprudence at Oxford University, John Gardner,
put it well when he said: AThe loss of Ronnie takes a bit of the sparkle out of life as a philosopher
of law.@14 But those who knew Dworkin and learned from his teaching and writing will never
forget the thrill of engaging with him and building upon his work. His sparkling prose, the
staggering ambition and monumental achievements of his works, and the flair and gusto of his
arguments and insights will never cease to illuminate and inspire. We shall not look upon his like
again. Ronald Dworkin made legal philosophy and constitutional theory the best they can be.
In this essay, we shall interpret Dworkin=s constitutional theory in light of three varieties
of perfectionism: (1) the idea that government should undertake a formative project of
inculcating civic virtues and encouraging responsibility in the exercise of rights; (2) the idea that
we should interpret the American Constitution so as to make it the best it can be; and (3) the idea
that we should defend a Constitution-perfecting theory that would secure not only procedural
liberties essential for democratic self-government but also substantive liberties essential for
personal self-government. We shall identify three gaps left by Dworkin=s work and sketch how
we have sought to fill those gaps in the spirit of his work through developing a mild form of
constitutional perfectionism.
II.

Taking Not Only Rights But Also Responsibilities and Virtues Seriously
First, there is perfectionism in political philosophy as it might be applied to constitutional

theory. In criticizing perfectionism in constitutional theory, Cass Sunstein states that “[t]he
perfectionist approach to constitutional law should not be confused with perfectionism in
political philosophy,” citing John Rawls, Political Liberalism.15 Rawls distinguishes between
political liberalism and perfectionist liberalism (as well as perfectionist political philosophies
more generally): Perfectionists of all stripes generally believe that statecraft is soulcraft, and that
the state must inculcate civic virtues or even moral excellence in the citizenry. Despite Sunstein=s
remark, we should acknowledge the variety of constitutional perfectionism that brings
perfectionist political philosophy to bear on constitutional theory. The two best examples are the

4
work of Sotirios A. Barber16 and that of Michael J. Sandel.17 On Barber=s view, we ultimately
must face up to the challenge of “supplying . . . the defect of better motives,” not just by relying
upon checks and balances and making “[a]mbition . . . counteract ambition” B James Madison=s
strategy in The Federalist No. 5118 B but also by inculcating civic virtues that are necessary for
responsible citizenship and for the success of the constitutional order. Similarly, Sandel argues
not only that government should undertake such a formative project but also that in justifying
constitutional rights like privacy, we should make recourse to substantive moral goods or virtues
and a conception of justice as cultivating virtues. In our book, Ordered Liberty, we embrace a
mild form of perfectionist constitutional theory along these lines.19 Strikingly, although Dworkin
rejected Rawls=s political liberalism in favor of a comprehensive ethical liberalism, and he
recognized considerable latitude for governmental encouragement of responsibility in the
exercise of rights, he never fully developed a perfectionist theory of governmental responsibility
to inculcate civic virtues.
A.

Respecting Freedom and Cultivating Virtues

Dworkin, alongside Rawls, is the leading contemporary proponent of a liberal conception
of justice.20 As Sandel interprets these liberals, they think about justice in terms of respecting
freedom as distinguished from maximizing welfare or cultivating virtues.21 Sandel himself is the
leading civic republican critic of such liberal conceptions of justice, interpreting them as holding
(1) that law should be neutral concerning competing conceptions of virtue or the best way to live
and (2) that Aa just society respects each person=s freedom to choose his or her conception of the
good life.@22 And he is the most prominent civic republican proponent of conceiving justice in
terms of cultivating virtues. Nonetheless, we want to point out some notable and unexpected
affinities between Dworkin=s and Sandel=s conceptions of justice as put forward respectively in
Justice for Hedgehogs and Justice: What=s the Right Thing to Do?
First, in Justice for Hedgehogs, Dworkin rejects neutrality and criticizes Rawls=s political
liberalism for bracketing conceptions of the good life in arguments about justice.23 Instead,
Dworkin defends a comprehensive ethical liberalism and argues for the integration of ethics,
morality, and justice.24 He introduces two ethical principles that Astate fundamental requirements
of living well@:
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The first is a principle of self-respect. Each person must take his own life
seriously: he must accept that it is a matter of importance that his life be a
successful performance rather than a wasted opportunity. The second is a
principle of authenticity. Each person has a special, personal responsibility for
identifying what counts as success in his own life; he has a personal responsibility
to create that life through a coherent narrative or style that he himself endorses.
He concludes: ATogether the two principles offer a conception of human dignity.@25 Dworkin
develops two related political principles, arguing that A[n]o government is legitimate unless it
subscribes to two reigning principles@: AFirst, it must show equal concern for the fate of every
person over whom it claims dominion. Second, it must respect fully the responsibility and right
of each person to decide for himself how to make something valuable of his life.@26 So, too,
Sandel criticizes Rawls=s political liberalism, arguing that we cannot separate arguments about
justice from arguments about competing conceptions of the good life and of the virtues that a
good society should promote.27
Second, in Justice for Hedgehogs, Dworkin is concerned to articulate the right process of
moral reasoning. In doing so, he looks back to Aristotle for an example of a holistic approach to
such reasoning and also looks to the relationship between questions of the good life and those of
the good polity.28 So, too, Sandel turns to Aristotle for a virtue-centered approach that integrates
moral reasoning about justice with reasoning about moral virtues and conceptions of the good
life.29
Third, in Justice for Hedgehogs, Dworkin explains that the idea of Aliving well” means
“creating not just a chronology but a narrative that weaves together values of character B
loyalties, ambitions, desires, tastes, and ideals.@30 Sandel has long criticized views like
Dworkin=s as forms of Avoluntarist@ liberalism that conceive the person as a freely choosing,
Aunencumbered self@ who is the Aauthor@ of his or her own ends and who can stand apart from
relationships and commitments.31 Yet in Justice, Sandel, like Dworkin, stresses the importance
of a Anarrative quest that aspires to a certain unity or coherence@32 and contends that we are
Astorytelling beings@ and Awe live our lives as narrative quests.@33
Finally, in Justice for Hedgehogs, just as in Life=s Dominion, Dworkin argues not only for
Ataking rights seriously,@ but also for Ataking responsibilities seriously.@34 Dworkin stands in
contrast to other forms of liberalism grounded in the idea that the state must be neutral between
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competing conceptions of the good life and the idea that rights insulate right-holders from moral
judgments about their exercise. Rather, Dworkin argues that the state may encourage people to
exercise their rights responsibly, short of compelling them to do what the government thinks is
the responsible thing to do.35 Sandel, much like Dworkin, has criticized those very liberal
conceptions of neutrality and of rights as insulating right-holders from moral judgments.36
And so, we must ask, are Dworkin=s comprehensive ethical liberalism and Sandel=s
perfectionist civic republicanism as far apart as Sandel=s criticisms of liberal conceptions of
justice might lead us to expect? In other work, we have suggested that the contrasts between
justice as respecting freedom and justice as cultivating virtues are not as stark as Sandel has put
them. The work of some liberal political theorists, most prominently William Galston and
Stephen Macedo, has narrowed the distance between these two conceptions. These theorists have
developed attractive conceptions of civic liberalism, arguing persuasively that liberalism has a
proper concern with cultivating civic virtues.37 We too work on this terrain of civic liberalism in
our book, Ordered Liberty.38
We shall suggest that the convergences between Dworkin, on the one hand, and the civic
liberals and civic republicans, on the other, are closer with respect to recognizing considerable
latitude for governmental promotion of responsible exercise of rights than they are with respect
to recognizing the need for governmental inculcation of civic virtues. That is, Dworkin
developed a theory of taking not only rights but also responsibilities seriously, but he for the
most part eschewed developing a perfectionist project of cultivating civic virtues.
B.

Taking Responsibilities as well as Rights Seriously

In Life=s Dominion, Dworkin propounds a notably Amoralized@ liberalism, making moral
arguments for the right to procreative autonomy and the right to die while defending the
authority of government to moralize concerning persons= exercise of these rights. He writes that
America=s political heritage is characterized by Atwo sometimes competing traditions:@ AThe first
is the tradition of personal freedom. The second assigns government responsibility for guarding
the public moral space in which all citizens live.@ Dworkin continues: AA good part of
constitutional law consists in reconciling these two ideas.@ And he asks: AWhat is the appropriate
balance in the case of abortion?@39
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This passage may have surprised many readers, both critics and allies, for two basic
reasons. First, critics who associate liberals like Dworkin with exaltation of the tradition of
personal freedom may be heartened that he acknowledges the legitimacy of the tradition that
assigns government responsibility for guarding the public moral space. And allies who celebrate
personal freedom may be alarmed that he sanctions governmental protection of the moral or
ethical environment. (Scanlon, a friendly liberal ally, conceded that liberals including Dworkin
have not talked very much about the latter tradition or about government promoting respect for
intrinsic values like the sanctity of life. Indeed, he found Dworkin=s reference to Amaintaining a
moral environment@ a Aslightly surprising phrase.@40)
Second, critics and allies commonly associate Dworkin with the notion of Arights as
trumps@ and thus with the idea that Ataking rights seriously@ practically precludes reconciling
rights with, or balancing rights against, governmental concern for the guarding the public moral
space.41 Indeed, some readers might have expected a book by Dworkin on the right of
procreative autonomy and the right to die to defend these rights solely on the basis of an
argument about personal freedom. And they might have expected Dworkin to argue that these
rights trump the very concerns regarding the moral or ethical environment that he here
acknowledges as part of the American political heritage and constitutional law.
Dworkin=s recognition of the place of the second tradition in the American political
heritage is significant. Both as a matter of fit with American constitutional precedents and
practice and as a matter of a plausible conception of government=s proper authority, Dworkin is
right to recognize that there are legitimate channels through which government may seek to
promote the moral or ethical environment. At the same time, there is no denying that this
tradition has been invoked to try to justify appalling deprivations of freedom and equality, for
example censorship of great works of literature and prohibition of interracial marriage.42 For this
reason, it is understandable that many liberals have sought to deny, avoid, or eradicate this
tradition. Yet Dworkin is right to see that the risks of this tradition do not justify rejecting it
entirely. Instead, he attempts to work with, and to work within, this tradition and to make it safe
for liberals and for fundamental principles of freedom and equality, together with commitments
to equal concern and dignity.

8
In Justice for Hedgehogs, in a passage concerning restricting liberty, Dworkin asks:
AWhy should [the majority] not be permitted to protect the religious and sexual culture it
favors...?@ He answers:
We need arguments like those of this book B the distinctions and
interconnections among responsibility, authenticity, influence, and subordination
that we have reviewed B properly to answer that question. The second principle of
dignity makes ethics special: it limits the acceptable range of collective decision.
We cannot escape the influence of our ethical environment: we are subject to the
examples, exhortations, and celebrations of other people=s ideas about how to live.
But we must insist that that environment be created under the aegis of ethical
independence: that it be created organically by the decisions of millions of people
with the freedom to make their own choices, not through political majorities
imposing their decisions on everyone.43
There clearly will be limits on government=s protection of the ethical environment.
Dworkin=s arguments for rights in both Life=s Dominion and Justice for Hedgehogs are
grounded, not in governmental neutrality or in personal autonomy, but in a deontology of state
conduct. In other words, Dworkin advances a theory that derives from a conception of the
permissible bases for collective decisions. His concern is with respecting limits on the grounds
for governmental decisions and with avoiding political majorities imposing their decisions on
everyone concerning questions such as how to live or how best to respect the sanctity of life.44
Dworkin specifically denied that he was articulating a theory of rights that asks what our
fundamental or especially important interests are and what freedoms are necessary to secure or
further those interests.45 For example, despite Dworkin=s justification for a right of procreative
autonomy, his theory differs in important respects from a theory of autonomy rooted in a
conception of the person and what is necessary for the development and exercise of moral
powers or the like. In this respect, his theory differs from the Rawlsian civic liberal theory of
deliberative autonomy that we have developed and applied in Securing Constitutional
Democracy, The Place of Families, and Ordered Liberty.46
This feature of Dworkin=s theory in part accounts for why he contemplated a relatively
large space (compared to most liberals) for governmental moralizing. On his view, there is a
large space between complete, hands-off noninterference with liberty, autonomy, dignity,
independence, or choice (of the sort strong autonomy theorists advocate) and coercion.

9
Furthermore, government need not, and should not, be neutral in that large space. It may
moralize, encourage responsibility, and the like, so long as it does not coerce the ultimate
decision.47 Likewise, citizens need not, and should not, be neutral.
At the same time, this feature of Dworkin=s theory may help explain why he did not
develop a civic liberalism concerned to inculcate civic virtues or to develop the moral powers or
capacities for responsible democratic and personal self-government. And why he did not put
forward a theory of civic education or of the roles of government and civil society in preparing
persons for responsible citizenship and orderly social reproduction. In our book, Ordered
Liberty, we have elaborated a mild form of civic liberal perfectionism that takes up these
projects. It aims to take civic virtues B along with rights and responsibilities B seriously. We
think our view is not incompatible with Dworkin=s ethical liberalism, even if he himself did not
develop such a theory.
III.

Making the Moral Reading of the American Constitution the Best It Can Be
A.

Interpretive Perfectionism

Second, we distinguish perfectionism in the sense of a theory of constitutional
interpretation entailing that we should interpret the Constitution so as to make it the best it can
be.48 On this view, as Sunstein puts it, constitutional interpretation is a matter of putting the
existing legal materials “in their best constructive light,” or of making them “the best they can
be.”49 Furthermore, it is the quest for the interpretation that provides the best fit with and
justification of the constitutional document and underlying constitutional order.50 This sense of
perfectionism B which we might call “interpretive perfectionism” B is famously associated with
Dworkin. We embrace this sense.
Dworkin=s interpretive perfectionism takes the form of the “moral reading” of the
American Constitution: the Constitution embodies abstract moral principles rather than laying
down particular historical conceptions, and interpreting and applying those principles require
fresh judgments of political theory about how they are best understood.51 Dworkin=s
development of the moral reading makes it sound (1) more utopian and (2) more philosophical
than it should. Therefore, he triggers objections that he propounds (1) a theory of the “perfect
Constitution”52 and (2) a theory that entails that judges should be philosophers.53 To be fair to
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Dworkin, he does not claim that the moral reading is a moral realist reading: a reading that is
prior to and independent of our own political and constitutional order and practice, and true to
the moral order of the universe.54 Rather, he contends that the moral reading is constrained by
the requirements of fit and integrity: thus, it is bound to account for the legal materials of the
existing constitutional order and practice.55 And so, even if Dworkin=s theory of constitutional
interpretation aims to provide the best interpretation of these legal materials B to make the
Constitution the best it can be B it is not unbounded.
Nonetheless, some critics charge that Dworkin=s moral reading is utopian in two senses.
One, it is a moral reading for a perfect liberal utopia: he would interpret the American
Constitution to protect every right and produce every outcome that his liberal political
philosophy would entail. And two, it is literally a theory for no place: he would give the same
moral reading irrespective of the actual history and practice of the constitutional scheme, for
example, the same for Britain as for the United States. We do not believe that such critics are
right about Dworkin=s moral reading, but they certainly are persistent and warrant a fuller
response than simply directing them to read Dworkin more carefully.
When confronted with the “perfect Constitution” challenge,56 Dworkin basically pleaded
(we paraphrase): “I do not believe the American Constitution is perfect. For example, while I do
believe that justice requires welfare rights, I do not believe that the Constitution protects such
rights.” To continue our paraphrase: “Your challenge applies to Frank Michelman B not me B
because he B not I B believes that the Constitution does protect welfare rights.”57 Beyond that,
Dworkin was at pains to make clear, as noted above, that the constraints of fit and integrity entail
that the actual Constitution is imperfect when measured against the standards of any normative
political philosophy or conception of justice.
Our tack here for responding to the perfect Constitution challenge to Dworkin=s moral
reading is to show how Lawrence G. Sager=s justice-seeking account of American constitutional
practice helps meet the challenge, in particular, through its accounts of the thinness of
constitutional justice and more particularly of the moral shortfall of judicially enforceable
constitutional law. Sager argues that certain constitutional principles required by justice are
judicially underenforced, yet nonetheless may impose affirmative obligations outside the courts
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on legislatures, executives, and citizens generally to realize them more fully.58 Sager=s view is an
important component of a full moral reading or justice-seeking account of the Constitution. For
it helps make sense of the evident thinness or moral shortfall of constitutional law. For example,
instead of saying that the American Constitution does not secure welfare rights B the move that
Dworkin makes B Sager says that the Constitution does secure welfare rights, but it leaves their
enforcement in the first instance to legislatures and executives.59 Once a scheme of welfare
rights and benefits is in place, courts have a secondary role in enforcing it equally and fairly.60
Furthermore, if Dworkin=s moral reading of the American Constitution, though it
embodies abstract moral principles, does not incorporate all of the important principles of
justice, we need an account of the difference between the two. Because Dworkin does not offer
such an account, he may leave his readers wondering whether his theory entails that the
American Constitution is a perfect liberal Constitution. To be sure, the constraints of fit and
integrity entail a gap between the Constitution and justice. But Dworkin says little about any
such gap, and what he does say implies that the gap may be narrow. For example, he says that
the Constitution is abstract, and therefore it should come as no surprise that any right we can
argue for as a matter of political morality we can also argue for as a matter of constitutional
law.61 And where he does acknowledge a significant gap between the Constitution and justice,
for example, with welfare rights, he does not provide a general account of why the Constitution
as he conceives it does not incorporate elements of justice like welfare rights.
Sager=s account of the domain of constitutional justice helps in this regard. He
distinguishes (1) judicially enforceable constitutional law from (2) constitutional justice, which
he in turn distinguishes from (3) political justice and (4) morality generally.62 Imagine a series of
progressively thicker concentric circles representing these four domains. Dworkin=s highly
general formulation of the “moral reading” may seem to blur the distinction between
constitutional law and constitutional justice, as well as that between constitutional justice and
political justice, and indeed that between constitutional law, on the one hand, and political justice
and morality generally, on the other. His “hedgehogist” commitment to the integration of ethics,
morality, and justice may further blur those distinctions. Sager=s justice-seeking account
underscores just how thin a moral reading of the Constitution has to be B as compared to our
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thicker conceptions of political justice and morality B in order to be credible as an account of
American constitutional practice.
Sager=s underenforcement thesis may entail a conception of legislative responsibility
congenial to the conception that Dworkin=s early work promised but never fully provided. We
refer to the “doctrine of political responsibility” that Dworkin argued (in “Hard Cases”) is
incumbent on legislatures as well as courts.63 The doctrine of political responsibility implies that
legislatures have an obligation to engage in coherent, responsible legislating with integrity (not
precisely as coherent, responsible, and constrained as judging with integrity, but legislating with
integrity nonetheless). And in Law=s Empire, Dworkin spoke of integrity in legislation as well as
integrity in adjudication.64 Jeremy Waldron opens The Dignity of Legislation by suggesting that
he aspires to do for legislation what Dworkin “purports to [have done] for adjudicative
reasoning.”65 We interpret Waldron to mean that he aims to develop a conception of legislating
with integrity, if not integrity in legislation.66 Admittedly, Dworkin himself did not do this. Nor
for that matter has Waldron fully accomplished it. We view Sager=s idea of judicial
underenforcement, coupled with his notion that legislatures have the obligation to enforce
constitutional norms and seek constitutional justice, as furthering Dworkin=s unfinished business.
For one thing, we should view legislatures as constrained by the Constitution outside the courts,
not just as legislating in constitutionally gratuitous ways. For another, we should view
legislatures as partners with courts in pursuing constitutional justice. Much work remains to be
done in articulating a full-blown conception of legislating with responsibility and integrity as an
aspect of the moral reading of the American Constitution.
B.

Perfecting the Substantive Constitution

Third, we distinguish perfectionism in the sense of theories that interpret the American
Constitution to secure or perfect the basic liberties that are preconditions for the legitimacy and
trustworthiness of the outcomes of the political processes. John Hart Ely=s Aprocess-perfecting@
theory of reinforcing representative democracy, put forward in his book, Democracy and
Distrust,67 is the most famous version of such a theory. According to Ely's theory, the American
Constitution=s core commitment is to representative democracy, and judicial review is justified
principally when the processes of representative democracy, and thus the political decisions
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resulting from them, are undeserving of trust. Ely argues that courts should reinforce or perfect
the procedural preconditions for the trustworthiness of the outcomes of the political processes,
but that they should eschew protecting substantive liberties.
Dworkin famously criticized Ely=s theory for taking a Aflight from substance@ to
process,68 including fleeing protecting substantive liberties like an individual=s Afreedom to make
ethical choices for himself@69 to protecting only procedural liberties like the right to vote. And he
developed a substantive conception of constitutional democracy B or a Apartnership@ view B as an
alternative to Ely=s procedural conception of majoritarian democracy. The partnership view of
democracy holds that “the people govern themselves each as a full partner in a collective
political enterprise so that a majority's decisions are democratic only when certain further
conditions are met that protect the status and interests of each citizen as a full partner in that
enterprise.”70 Majority support, just on its own, does not supply a “moral reason” for what the
majority supports; ideas drawn from political morality about “justice, equality, and liberty”
should inform our views about what is a democratic decision.71 Thus, A[t]he partnership
conception ties democracy to the substantive constraints of legitimacy.@72 Dworkin is persuasive
in contending that protection of, and respect for, rights that are the conditions for moral
membership in our political community B rooted in equal concern and dignity B are themselves
preconditions for the legitimacy of the outcomes of majoritarian political processes.73 Here
Dworkin B despite his criticism of Ely B appears to have taken a page out of Ely=s book in
conceiving our rights as Ademocratic conditions@ and in arguing that courts protecting
constitutional rights guarantee democracy rather than compromise it. But unlike Ely, Dworkin
would include, among the conditions of democracy, certain Asubstantive@ rights rooted in equal
concern and dignity in addition to Aprocedural@ rights.74
Dworkin has powerfully expressed the conditions of moral membership in our political
community. But we would recast the architecture of his constitutional theory to differentiate it
more sharply from that of Ely=s process-perfecting theory. Characterizing all of our substantive
and procedural rights as Ademocratic conditions,@ as Dworkin does, may lead to unnecessary
trouble and resistance. Many readers may resist his argument that substantive rights grounded in
equal concern and dignity are Ademocratic conditions.@ They may suspect that Dworkin is pulling
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a fast one or being too clever by packing all of the substantive rights that constrain majoritarian
political processes into the Ademocratic conditions.@75
One of us has sought to develop a substantive Constitution-perfecting theory as an
alternative to the process-perfecting theory advanced by Ely.76 Such a theory would reinforce not
only the procedural liberties (those related to democratic participation) but also the substantive
liberties (those related to personal autonomy and ethical independence) embodied in the
American Constitution and presupposed by its constitutional democracy. Securing Constitutional
Democracy puts forward a guiding framework with two fundamental themes: first, securing the
basic liberties that are preconditions for deliberative democracy, to enable citizens to apply their
capacity for a conception of justice to deliberating about and judging the justice of basic
institutions and social policies as well as the common good, and second, securing the basic
liberties that are preconditions for deliberative autonomy, to enable citizens to apply their
capacity for a conception of the good to deliberating about and deciding how to live their own
lives. Together, these themes afford everyone the status of free and equal citizenship. They
reflect two bedrock structures of deliberative political and personal self-government.77 Unlike
process theories, this Constitution-perfecting theory provides a firm grounding for rights of
privacy and autonomy, along with liberty of conscience and freedom of association, as necessary
to secure individual freedom and to promote a diverse and vigorous civil society. This theory
also shows how basic liberties associated with personal autonomy, along with those related to
democratic participation, fit together into a coherent scheme of basic liberties and constitutional
essentials that are integral to the American Constitution and its underlying constitutional
democracy. The architecture of such a Constitution-perfecting theory can comfortably house all
of what Dworkin conceives as the conditions of moral membership in our political community
without recasting substantive liberties constraining majorities as Ademocratic conditions.@ On this
theory, we perfect the whole substantive Constitution, not merely the partial procedural
Constitution.
Through offering this account of the moral shortfall of the moral reading and developing
a substantive Constitution-perfecting theory, we aspire to make the moral reading of the
American Constitution the best it can be.
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